Cabinet Office
A number of media reports have appeared in recent days concerning the governments Counter Disinformation Unit.
Here you can read the facts about how it operates and what it does and does not do. It also includes information on the Rapid Response Unit, which was closed in summer 2022.
1. Fact Sheet on the Counter-Disinformation Unit
What is mis/disinformation?
The UK government defines disinformation as the deliberate creation and spreading of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead people, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. Misinformation is the inadvertent spread of false information.
Misinformation and disinformation are not new. But social media and new technologies have made it easier, quicker and cheaper than ever before for both domestic and foreign malign actors to spread disinformation to huge audiences and specific targeted groups.
What is the Counter Disinformation Unit?
The Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU) was first set up within the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in 2019 and it has since responded to periods of acute disinformation risk including Covid-19.
Following Machinery of Government changes in February this year, the unit sits with the new Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
The team works with partners across government, civil society and in tandem with the regulatory approach through the Online Safety Bill and DSITs Media Literacy Strategy.
Its purpose is to understand disinformation narratives and attempts to artificially manipulate the information environment to ensure that the government understands the scope and reach of harmful mis and disinformation and can take appropriate action. Such action can include posting a response on social media rebutting the claim, awareness raising campaigns to promote the facts, and working with social media companies to encourage them to promote authoritative sources of information and consistently enforce their terms of service.
What areas does the CDU work across?
The CDU focuses on content targeted at UK audiences across which poses a risk to:
- Public health,
- Public safety, or
- National security.
Through the COVID-19 pandemic, this has seen the CDU counter disinformation threats that have suggested bleach is an effective way to cure COVID-19 and that 5G masts should be burned down to prevent the spread of the virus. It is currently focused on disinformation related to Russias illegal invasion of Ukraine, and has already countered Russian disinformation about Ukraine including denials of mass casualty events including the Bucha massacre and the bombing of the maternity hospital in Mariupol.
How does the CDU conduct its monitoring work?
The CDU uses publicly available data, including material shared on social media platforms, to develop an understanding of disinformation narratives and trends. It does not, and has never, monitored individuals and all data is anonymised wherever possible.
See the CDU Privacy Notice for further details
How does the CDU work with social media platforms?
The CDU works closely with the major social media platforms to understand their terms of service and to encourage them to promote authoritative sources of information, for example providing links to NHS information on covid vaccines.
It is not the CDUs primary purpose to monitor for harmful content to flag to social media platforms.
However, where the unit encounter content which meets the two criteria below, content may be referred to the platform concerned for their consideration:
- The content poses a demonstrable risk to public health, safety or national security
- Is assessed to breach the platforms terms of service
No action is mandated by the government and it is up to the platform to independently decide whether or not to take any action in line with their terms of service. The Online Safety Bill will require the biggest platforms to have transparent terms of service and to consistently enforce them.
What sort of disinformation did the CDU refer to social media companies?
Examples of narratives the CDU has referred to social media platforms includes:
- COVID-19 disinformation narratives, such as claims pushing harmful cures for COVID-19 e.g. bleach.
- Disinformation related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, such as denial of mass casualty events by Russian Embassy accounts, e.g. claims the Bucha massacre and the bombing of the maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, were both hoaxes.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 95% of referrals made by the CDU related to state backed disinformation.
How does the CDU ensure freedom of expression?
Preserving freedom of speech is extremely important as part of the CDUs work. It does not monitor political debate and the CDU does not refer any content from journalists, politicians or political parties to social media companies.
The Online Safety Bill will put in place legal protections to ensure that platforms enforce their terms and conditions and cannot arbitrarily remove content.
Who is the CDU accountable to?
As with all government work, Ministers have ultimate responsibility for the CDU and receive regular updates on the its work. Ministers are accountable to Parliament and the relevant select committee where they have regularly attended to provide updates, for example the minister gave a publicly available update to the relevant Committee at the start of the pandemic on the governments approach to countering covid related mis and disinformation.
Was the CDU a secret?
No. The work of the CDU was publicly announced in a press release and the then Culture Secretary discussed the workings of the unit with Parliament in an April 2020 Select Committee evidence session.
It has been talked about more than 200 times in Parliament and has been scrutinised by the DCMS Select Committee with public hearings and we welcome this scrutiny from MPs on the CDUs work.
2. Fact Sheet on the Rapid Response Unit
What was the RRU? / Why was it set up?
The RRU was created in early 2018 as a central team in the government Communications Service, which used publicly available information to identify trends in media and social media coverage.
This was to help government departments understand how their announcements were being reported on and received by the public and the media.
The RRUs role was limited to sharing information across government. It never had any contact with social media companies. It was essentially like a digital cuttings service.
When was it set up? Does it still exist?
The Rapid Response Unit was created in 2018 and disbanded in Augus