GovWire

Section 1: Patentability

Intellectual Property Office

January 2
13:54 2024

1.01

The Patents Act 1977 sets out for the first time to codify what is meant by a patentable invention. Previous legislation up to and including the 1949 Act had merely repeated the stipulation, originally set out in the Statute of Monopolies of 1623, that a patent may be granted only for a manner of new manufacture.

1.02

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Section 1(1)
A patent may be granted only for an invention in respect of which the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say
(a) the invention is new;
(b) it involves an inventive step;
(c) it is capable of industrial application;
(d) the grant of a patent for it is not excluded by subsections (2) and (3) or section 4A below; and references in this Act to a patentable invention shall be construed accordingly
.

1.03

A patent may only be granted if the invention meets the above conditions. The fact that an invention meets the requirements of s.1(1) does not however mean that a patent must be granted, since there are other requirements, as set out in later sections, which must also be complied with.

1.04

s.125(1) is also relevant

Invention in this context means that which is specified in a claim. Although the term has a meaning in ordinary speech, in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1) Lord Hoffmann declined to attempt to define the term more closely, saying that judges would be well advised to put on one side their intuitive sense of what constitutes an invention until they have considered the questions of novelty, inventiveness and so forth. It is possible for a specification to contain claims which relate to patentable inventions as well as claims which define inventions which are not patentable or matters which are not inventions. In such a case amendment is necessary, since a patent should be granted only when each claim defines a patentable invention. A claim will generally be held to be bad if anything falling within its scope is not patentable.

1.05

The term a patentable invention is defined by setting out four conditions, all of which must be satisfied in order for an invention to qualify for the grant of a patent. Since they are expressed as positive requirements the onus is upon an applicant to demonstrate compliance when faced with a reasonable challenge. The manner in which each of the conditions (a), (b) and (c) is to be assessed is set forth in ss.2, 3 & 4 respectively. The fourth condition involves certain things which, for purposes of the Act, are not to be regarded as inventions (see 1.07 to 1.40.4) and certain inventions for which a patent will not be granted see 1.41-1.46

1.06

s.130(7)-s.91 is also relevant

The tests set out in s.1(1) and further elaborated in s.1(2)-(4) and ss.2-4 are so framed as to have, as nearly as practicable, the same effects in the UK as the corresponding provisions of the EPC; these are Articles 52-57. (More particularly, EPC aa.52(1) to (3) and 53 correspond to s.1(1) to (4)). Hence, although not binding on the Office, decisions on patentability given by EPO Boards of Appeal are of persuasive value in interpreting ss.1-4 (see 0.07-09, 1.09 and 130.30-33).

Excluded subject matter

Section 1(2)
It is hereby declared that the following (among other things) are not inventions for the purposes of this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of -
(a) a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method;
(b) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever;
(c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business, or a program for a computer;
(d) the presentation of information;
but the foregoing provision shall prevent anything from being treated as an invention for the purposes of this Act only to the extent that a patent or application for a patent relates to that thing as such.

1.07

Section 1(2) of the Act defines certain categories of things which are not to be regarded as inventions, as Jacob LJ puts it in paragraph 12 of Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd & Ors Rev 1 [2007] RPC 7 (Aerotel/Macrossan). The normal meaning of invention is therefore qualified by the removal of these categories. Jacob LJ also considered that there is no overarching principle behind the inclusion of these particular categories, and no guidance on whether they are to be construed broadly or restrictively. In particular, they noted that, as the exclusions are not expressed as exceptions, the general principle that exceptions should be interpreted restrictively does not apply to them.

1.08

The current practice in dealing with excluded matter under s. 1(2) is derived from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Aerotel/Macrossan (see 1.09.1, 1.18, 1.20, 1.33-1.33.1, 1.34.1). This judgment considered all previous authorities on the matter, and having been endorsed in numerous subsequent decisions is to be treated as a definitive statement of how the law on patentable subject matter is to be applied in the UK.

Relationship with the EPC and decisions of the EPO

1.09

As discussed above (see 1.06) decisions of the EPO Boards of Appeal are of persuasive value; furthermore where the EPO Boards of Appeal have formed a settled view of European patent law, this will generally be followed by the UK courts (see 0.08) and 130.30-31).

1.09.1

However in Aerotel/Macrossan, the Court of Appeal analysed EPO Boards of Appeal decisions on the question of excluded matter and concluded that practice was not yet sufficiently settled to enable the Court to depart from precedent UK case-law (see 1.11). This was reiterated in Symbian Ltds Application [2009] RPC 1 (Symbian) (see paragraph 46) and HTC v Apple (see 1.09.2), and it remains the case until the UK courts conclude otherwise.

1.09.2

In an attempt to address whether case-law concerning excluded matter is settled, and derive uniformity of application of European patent law, the President of the EPO referred four questions on the patentability of computer programs to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in October 2008 (G3/08) (PDF, 247KB). However, the Board concluded that the referral was inadmissible because the decisions referred to were not considered to be divergent, and declined to answer the questions beyond determining their admissibility. This led to the Court of Appeal reaffirming its view that practice was not yet settled in

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