Ministry Of Defence
Last year I spoke of an extraordinarily dangerous moment, with the return of war in Europe alongside unfolding great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.
And here we are again: at the end of another year and another set of equally profound developments. Some are startling and horrific, like the barbaric attacks in Israel; others so frustratingly familiar that the world barely stops to notice. This summers coup in Niger - the ninth in Africa since the turn of the decade is an obvious case in point.
As the year draws to a close, the security outlook feels even more dangerous than was the case 12 months ago. And thats coming from me someone known for their optimism
People often ask me what keeps me awake at night. The honest answer is that I sleep well. Mostly because I am tired. And because Im blessed with a supportive family. And I also sleep well because of the Armed Forces, the Civil Service and our Intelligence Agencies who always seem to pull out the stops when required. Our evacuation from Sudan in the spring the largest of any Western nation reminds us of what we can achieve at scale, at reach, and at speed.
But how well I sleep might not be an accurate barometer to assess the defence and security of the nation
I think most people now recognise that weve entered an era of renewed great power and state on state competition, and that was the theme of my first lecture to RUSI two years ago.
But Im less sure weve really assimilated the scale or the volatility or the pace of the security challenges weve seen over the past couple of years and what this means for the future.
So tonight, Id like to set the scene by offering three perspectives.
First, continued recognition of this turning point in global security, in which the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza both have the potential to further destabilise an already febrile and agitated world, but are part of a broader backdrop.
Second is to say that we are responding. We are witnessing the return of statecraft and the staples of alliances, technology and investment to manage these dangers. The increasing trajectory of defence spending in this country, the collective strength of NATO, our network of international partners, and the technological transformation of the Armed Forces, all offer much to reassure.
But is it enough? For the final part of my speech, I want to consider how we calibrate ourselves to meet the demands of an openly contested and volatile world; not just for the next 5 years but over the next one or two decades.
Let me start with a few words about Octobers cruel attacks by Hamas and after visiting Israel last week with the Defence Secretary.
Those of us watching on in horror cannot underestimate the sense within Israel that this is an existential threat. Or the vulnerability felt by Jewish people worldwide, including here in the United Kingdom.
The Government has been clear in its view that Israel is entitled to bring the perpetrators of such hideous acts to justice, and to defeat the threat posed by Hamas.
Inevitably fighting in such densely packed urban areas risks causing immense harm to civilians, which is why we have urged restraint and we continue to work with our partners in the region to identify options to deliver aid.
The attacks of October 7 have served to heighten the simmering tensions and dire conditions in Gaza. Tensions which resonate so strongly on the Arab street and risk inflaming an arc of instability stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf of Oman.
That is why the UK deployed air and naval assets to the region: to be ready for contingencies, contribute to relief operations, and to safeguard wider regional stability.
The level of uncertainty and degree of potential volatility for the whole of the Middle East is worrying. We assess Iran doesnt want a direct war. And the presence of two US carrier strike groups sent an unmistakable message to Tehran. But Iran is comfortable with the way events have unfolded. The dilemmas for Israel. The threat posed by Lebanons Hezbollah and Yemens Houthis. Militia groups exploiting this crisis to challenge Americas role in the region. Hence the multiple attacks on international shipping in the southern Red Sea, and over 80 attacks on US and coalition forces in Iraq and Syria.
America has shown commendable restraint. But there are multiple scenarios in which this crisis could escalate. Our Gulf partners are nervous. They point to a perceived lack of engagement more generally by the West and more specifically in the two-state solution over many years.
All of this is sufficiently serious to warrant the attention of responsible nations everywhere. But the instability that flowed from October 7 does not occur in isolation. The backdrop includes a broader challenge to the world order.
It occurs alongside rising tension in the Western Balkans. Increased confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Ever more bellicose rhetoric from Pyongyang. Continued instability in Africa. The re-emergence of long running territorial disputes, most recently between Venezuela and Guyana.
And then there is Russias continuing war in Ukraine. After two years of bitter sacrifice, it should be clear to Putin that the Ukrainian people will never permit their country to return to Moscows orbit.
And yet President Putin pushes on regardless of the continuing cost: to international stability, to Ukraine and to his own people.
Yes, Ukraines counter-offensive gained less ground than was hoped. Russian defences proved stronger than expected. And Ukraine is fighting with a citizen Army. Men in their 30s and 40s with families back home. Ukraine is cautious with their lives. We would be too. And it speaks volumes about the contrasting approaches of Russian and Ukrainian leaders.
But territory is not the only measure of how this war progresses. And talk of stalemate or the advantages to Russia of settling for a long war are far too superficial. Not enough is made of Russias predicament. Not enough is made of Ukraines success. And Putin is no grand master of strategy.
He sought to weaponize Russias energy exports. But European countries responded by reducing their dependence.
He sought to withhold global food supplies. But the world responded with the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
He sought to coerce the West with reckless nuclear threats. But that elicited global condemnation, including from China, India and Saudi Arabia.
And now hes wanted by the International Criminal Court. Hes suffered the shock and humiliation of an attempted coup. Crimea is no longer safe. The Black Sea Fleet has scattered. He has to keep 400 thousand troops in Ukraine to hold on to what he has taken. And he cannot order a general mobilisation - at least not ahead of next years election - for fear of how his own people will respond. Abroad he is a Potemkin-like figure, unable to rely on international support because Russia has few real friends in the world.
Increasingly he resembles a prisoner of his own making. But, if his first catastrophic mistake was invading Ukraine, he is now making his second calamitous blunder - the Russian economy is being twisted even more out of shape. Nearly 40% of all Russian public expenditure is being spent on defence. That is more than the aggregate of health and education. And the last time we saw these levels was at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This is disastrous for Russia and its people. And it is in contrast to President Zelensky who speaks of a new Ukraine: a country fit for its heroes. A country on the path to NATO and EU membership. A country that represents everything that Russia is not: confident, dynamic, democratic, innovative, and open to the world. A country that is respected and embraced by the community of nations. A country with a future.
This leads me to my second point: the return of statecraft, as countries shift and align in support of common interests across the world and seek to use all the instruments of power.
Witness how the United States, and others, are seeking to engage India to counterbalance China; or how President Biden hosted the leaders of Japan and South Korea at Camp David.
Or consider how European nations were willing to commit some 500 billion euros to subsidise their citizens through last winters energy crisis, weening themselves from Russian gas and thus denying Putin the leverage he sought.
The UK is also re-learning the art of statecraft. This includes: the Hiroshima Accord with Japan, the Downing Street Accord with South Korea, the Atlantic Declaration with the US, the extension of security guarantees to Sweden and Finland on their journey to NATO; our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force; and the hosting of the AI Summit at Bletchley Park.
Russias aggression continues to provoke an extraordinary response.
Across Europe defence spending is up. In 2022 the figure reached nearly 280 billion, 30% higher than it was a decade ago. Finland is up 36%, Sweden 12%, Poland 11%.
And NATO is stronger. This years summit in Vilnius saw the biggest transformation of NATOs readiness since the Cold War. And the UK is right at the heart of this: offering 25% of NATOs maritime forces and more than 10% of land and air.
When we stand with NATO we draw on the economic, diplomatic, demographic, as well as industrial and technological heft of 31 nations, soon to become 32. Our combined GDP becomes 20 times greater than Russias. Our regular armed forces of 140,000 becomes part of a force o