Ministry Of Defence
Good afternoon, everybody. So Im the Minister for Defence procurement in the UK, I dont have a speech as such, and what I mean by that is I havent got one written by the Civil Service. When I was a Treasury Minister, before I got this job, I went to a conference a bit like this about AI. And there were four Secretary of States speaking at this conference, and what neither of them knew was that they all had the same gag when they started, which is they read their speech, the first paragraph and guess what? As if it had been written by Chat GPT. Once you get to the fourth iteration of that is not as funny as it was the first time. So this hasnt been written by Chat GPT, this is me because Im very passionate about this issue because I think autonomy in defence is an amazing opportunity.
And Ill explain why but first of all, congratulations to my hosts. Thank you for inviting me because this happens to coincide with a very important day. Today the Ministry of Defence weve launched officially our new procurement system, which Ive put forward. Its called the Integrated Procurement Model. Now, just to put that in context, when I got this job last April, after Alex Chalk became Lord Chancellor, I replaced him as Minister for Defence Procurement, we were in the middle of a vote in the House of Commons and as I was walking around the lobby voting, my colleagues were coming up to me and they all congratulating me. And each of them in the same phrase would say, but by the way, youve got Ajax. So this job is sort of synonymous with one particular project, and I think from day one, I knew we needed to reform procurement. And when I announced the new procurement model on the 28th of February I was very clear that whilst this is about responding to all the concerns that have been brought up over the years, with programmes like Ajax but not just Ajax, Nimrod there is many of them going back over many years time.
The most important reason to reform procurement is much more fundamental than any of those reasons or to do with any of those programmes. And it is simply this that if we as a country, and our allies, as well, are to compete in the future with our adversaries with the way they are investing in defence and technology, we have no choice but to reform procurement. And one of the reasons why I think this new model hopefully will actually take effect not just being launched, but as you will know it has become cultural within MOD, which is something well be working on, its fair to say.
The reason for that is because if we dont reform procurement, our adversaries will just move too far away from us. And so I wanted to first of all set out what this reform is all about. Because its heart is technology, and for me, the most important part of that is around uncrewed systems and also all the technological advances that come with that and the systems that they depend upon. So fundamentally, its not about platforms is as you know, its about systems, its about architectures, about software.
And so theres five key features of the new system. And now the first one is fundamental. Its called an Integrated Procurement Model for a reason. Youd be aware that in 2021, we announced a new integrated operating concept for the UK Armed Forces, but in announcing that and recognising the reality of modern warfare is an integrated battlespace. We maintain whats called a delegated procurement model ie. primarily having three frontline services procuring what we describe as bottom up basis whereas to me, if you want an integrated approach, you have to integrated procurement.
And so the first point is to have joined up approach to procurement in practice. The bte noire is what we call over programming, this phrase over programming means that essentially, the armed forces are trying to procure more stuff than there is management capacity to buy or frankly, capacity in DE&S and elsewhere to deliver and so the way we have controlled spending in recent years is you move programmes to the right, delay so that literally to control cost. And its not unique to MOD, its typical of big capital projects. They cost taxpayers a lot of money but its a particular issue in defence, because if you delay programmes they become more expensive and question marks that come out about the future those programmes.
And so one thing I want to see more of is by taking a joined up approach that is pan-defence, you are more likely to make your priorities based on the most important reason which is the threat we face and procuring in a joined up fashion. Okay, so a good example were currently working on our munitions plan for the munitions we purchase as a UK MOD over the next 10 years, particularly to replenish our stocks, following the significant gifting to Ukraine. The best way to do that is pan-defence. If we just said to the single services, what do you each need? We end up with an outcome that had a third, a third a third. But to me, that shouldnt be the priority, the priority is the threats we face as a country and what we need to counter it and Ill just finish on that point because were here to talk about autonomy.
The best example of that joined up approach is drones actually. So weve actually had some fantastic, military entrepreneurs in the MOD weve seen within the frontline command some fantastic experimentalism. That has led to some really cutting edge capabilities in the uncrewed space, some of which has been used in Ukraine, as youll be aware of. The problem is, once you take those to the next level, procuring those systems to become part of an integrated force that can be effective in battle, at that point, you do need to have a more integrated approach.
We cannot just rely on the theory of 1,000 flowers that 1,000 flowers will bloom, as you will know, you have to have common data standards, the ability of your capabilities to talk to each other and to the other services. So that is a really good example of where we need to now move into a more joined up phase which was a key piece of the Uncrewed Strategy that I announced earlier this year.
The second part is checks and balances. Now, first of all, thats about oversight. So we will have a new Integrated Design Authority to oversee these changes to make sure they actually happen in reality, if the procurement comes forward, and the requirements dont enable whatever that system is to talk to the other services, it would be scored negatively, itd be returned to wherever it came from. I mean, thats in a nutshell, but I think theres a really key part checks and balance which is my view as Minister for Defence Procurement, which is that to be as diplomatic as I can, my experience with this past year is that when the requirements come forward to you, the Minister, when the programme comes up to be signed off, shall we say there was something of an expectation that it will be signed off. Whereas I take a slightly different view. And to me, the most important part of this second aspect of checks and balances is what I call the creation of a second opinion.
Genuinely kicking the tyres on programs at the beginning. So that you ask the right questions and you get the right answer. Because there has been history, which is totally understandable, institutional, as in the UK defence Im sure it is the same in other countries, in fact I know it is as I have discussed some of my colleagues and my counterparts in other countries, is this sort of what we call the platform presumption. Weve got the mark five and after ten years we can have the mark six, seven, etc. But what if thats not the right solution for the threat that we face?
And so the second opinion we are very luck in the MOD, we dont just have the military. We have amazing scientists in the Dstl. We have DE&S with all their interface with industry, which is now being strengthened with something called the DE&S gateway. We basically have this repository of data and information that is extraordinary. And so I want to have a position where when that procurement begins, that big programme, you dont just have the military assessment of the requirements that you need. You have the challenge of the other experts that we have in our institution, the Dstl and so on telling you how technically viable that is. So for example, that key question, should it actually be an uncrewed system? And this is not a minor subject of conversation.
Were talking about fundamentally questioning some assumptions about the capabilities that we presume well probably be procuring in the future and I suspect the military evidence for wargaming from Ukraine, will show that increasingly we are going to be vulnerable, and that we need to do what other countries have started to do, I have just seen that the the US has just announced they have cancelled a major programme and that would have been crewed and that will now be uncrewed, it was a major reconnaissance programme FARA.
So the third point is about exportability to checks and balances all joins up with exportability, the FT covered this today, when I was talking to them really saw this as a standout feature, and I think thats fair, because, again, going back to the first day of the job, you get your first submission, which is what the Civil Service give you as a piece of advice. And first one I had on procurement had about a sentence about exportability in fact, the letter to the Chief Secretary that went with it recommended to procure it. And awaiting my sign-off was that it it didnt mention prospective benefits of exportability and I think this should be ingrained in acquisition from the beginning.
And theres two key reasons for that. The first one is what is the main problem at the moment in defence its the resilience of our supp