GovWire

R062022_220711_Sileby_Junction

PDF, 2.49 MB, 37 pages

This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology.

Request an accessible format.

If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need aversion of this document in a more accessible format, please email enquiries@raib.gov.uk.Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

Summary

At about 05:29 hrs on Wednesday 5 May 2021, a train made up of machines used for reprofiling (grinding) rails passed a signal at danger (red) at Sileby Junction, between Leicester and Loughborough, resulting in a near miss with an empty passenger train travelling in the opposite direction. The passenger train had cleared the junction less than 10 seconds before the rail grinding train reached it. There were no injuries or damage as a consequence, but the incident resulted in delays to several trains in the area.

The incident was caused by two factors. Firstly, the driver did not control the trains speed to be able to stop at the signal at danger, probably due to fatigue. Secondly, although the trains systems made an automatic emergency brake intervention, this did not stop the train before it reached a point at which it could collide with another train. A probable underlying factor was associated with the fatigue risk management processes used by the train operator.

RAIB has also made four observations which, although not linked to the cause of the incident, nevertheless had safety implications. The first observation identified that there was no system-wide risk assessment to control the risk of overruns arising from the operation of non-standard vehicles on the national rail network. The second observation noted that the train operator did not obtain safety-critical information about the driver when he joined the company. The remaining observations relate to industry processes for managing the operational and technical response to such incidents.

Recommendations

There are two recommendations arising from this investigation. These cover fatigue risk management and managing the risks of trains with lower braking rates passing signals at danger. RAIB has also identified three learning points, addressing the use of napping as a fatigue mitigation, the importance of organisations sharing safety-critical information when employees move between companies, and railway procedures for post-incident management.

Notes to editors

1. The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.

2. RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.

3. For media enquiries, please call 01932 440015.

