Rail Accident Investigation Branch
Summary
At around 17:43 hrs on Sunday 5 May 2023, a London Underground train departing from Clapham Common station was brought to a halt by a passenger emergency alarm activation after smoke and a smell of burning entered the train. The train came to a stand with two cars inside the tunnel and four cars adjacent to the platform. The trains doors remained closed. Around 100 of the trains (estimated) 500 passengers subsequently self-evacuated onto the platform through the interconnecting doors between the trains cars and the trains windows, some of which were broken by passengers either inside the train or on the station platform. Station staff began opening the trains doors around four and a half minutes after the train came to a stand.
The incident resulted in minor injuries being reported by a few passengers. However, it had the potential to have more serious consequences, not least because Clapham Common station has a narrow island platform which increases the risk of passengers falling onto the track and potentially being exposed to conductor rails and trains approaching on the adjacent southbound line.
RAIBs investigation found that passengers perceived a significant risk from fire, and that they became increasingly alarmed when the trains doors remained closed and they did not receive suitable information or see any effective action from London Underground staff.
An underlying factor to the incident was that operational staff were not provided with the procedures or training needed to effectively identify and manage incidents where passenger behaviour can rapidly escalate. A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.
Recommendations
RAIB has made three recommendations, all addressed to London Underground. The first relates to procedures and training to ensure that staff have clear guidance on how to deal with out-of-course events. The second relates to learning from previous incidents not being lost and to recommendations being tracked through to implementation. The third recommendation is that London Underground review its risk assessment processes so that the risks associated with out-of-course events and at specific locations are effectively identified and assessed.